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Abstract—Self-sovereign identity (SSI) is considered to be a “killer application” of blockchain. However, there is a lack of systematic
architecture designs for blockchain-based SSI systems to support methodical development. An aspect of such gap is demonstrated in
current solutions, which are considered coarse grained and may increase data security risks. In this paper, we first identify the
lifecycles of three major SSI objects (i.e., key, identifier, and credential) and present fine-grained design patterns critical for application
development. These patterns are associated with particular state transitions, providing a systematic view of system interactions and
serving as a guidance for effective use of these patterns. Further, we present an SSI platform architecture, which advocates the notion
of Design-Pattern-as-a-Service. Each design pattern serves as an API by wrapping the respective pattern code to ease application
development and improve scalability and security. We implement a prototype and evaluate it on feasibility and scalability.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Self-Sovereign Identity, Design Pattern, Identity.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A Legal identity of an entity (i.e. an individual/orga-nization) is defined as a set of attributes about the
entity (e.g., name). Identity management includes main-
taining identity attribute data and controlling their access,
which is fundamentally required in the digitized world.
There are three key roles in identity management: holder,
issuer, and verifier. An entity who registers an identifier
associated with some identity attribute data in a particular
system is considered as an identity holder. A credential is
a verifiable claim against some identity attribute data (e.g.,
date of birth) and facts (e.g., transcripts) about the holder,
which is attested and digitally signed by a credential issuer.
A credential verifier is an entity who requests a specific
credential from a trusted issuer and verifies the credential’s
authenticity through the issuer’s signature.
Most of the existing identity management solutions re-
quire a centralized authority, either for identity registration
or credential verification. For example, X.509 certificate [1]
requires a trusted authority to maintain the mapping be-
tween the name and corresponding public key. PGP [2], as
a more decentralized solution, needs to rely on ICANN to
assign domain names. Thus, holders often do not have full
control over their identity data which may be disclosed or
compromised without the holder’s knowledge, e.g., Aad-
haar data leak [3].
Self-sovereign identity (SSI) is an emerging identity man-
agement paradigm that allows entities to have true own-
ership of their identity data and control their use without
involving any intermediary. As self-sovereign identity needs
no intermediary, which is aligned with the design nature
of blockchain, it is considered to be one of the “killer ap-
plications” of blockchain technology [4]. W3C has recently
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published a design guideline that utilizes blockchains to
implement SSI, in which blockchain provides a decentral-
ized public key infrastructure to uniquely register entities
via W3C decentralized identifiers (DIDs) without any inter-
mediary [5]. Identity credentials can be designed following
W3C verifiable credentials data model [6]. Many organiza-
tions are currently exploring how to leverage blockchain
to build SSI solutions, e.g., uPort [7], Sovrin [8], Block-
stack [9]. There are also academic works on the design and
development of SSI applications [10], [11], [12]. Soltani et
al. build a self-sovereign identity framework for customer
on-boarding on blockchain [11]. Takemiya and Vanieiev
proposes a blockchain-based protocol for storing encrypted
personal information and sharing verifiable claims [12].
However, there is a lack of systematic architecture design
for blockchain-based SSI systems, which is demonstrated
in the currently available solutions. Also, current solutions
are considered coarse grained and may lead to less scalable
implementation or a reduced level of data security, e.g.
inadequate access control for credentials.
Therefore, in this paper, we first identify the lifecycles of
three major SSI objects (i.e., key, identifier, and credential), in
which the state transitions are associated with fine-grained
design patterns that we consider critical to SSI application
development. The lifecycles, along with the design pattern
annotations, provide an SSI-focused systematic view of
system interactions and a guide to effective usage of the
design patterns to improve data security and system scala-
bility. Further, based on the design patterns and lifecycles,
we present an SSI platform architecture that supports the
idea of Design-Pattern-as-a-Service (DPaaS). The platform
consists of a full range of SSI services, from key management
to credential verification, underwritten by two classes of
operations, namely regular services and design pattern services.
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Fig. 1. Lifecycles of three main objects in Self-Sovereign Identity.
Particularly, in each design pattern service, we encapsulate
and wrap the respective design pattern code as an API so
that the design principles and benefits of the pattern can be
easily incorporated into application development. Finally,
we implement a proof-of-concept prototype and evaluate it
in terms of feasibility and scalability. The results show that
our approach is feasible and has scalable performance.
2 LIFECYCLES OF SSI OBJECTS
Fig. 1 illustrates three lifecycles of the main objects and their
interconnection in SSI: lifecycle of key, identifier (DID), and
credential. The figure also highlights our SSI design patterns
associating them with relevant states and transitions within
the lifecycles. Due to space constraints, we describe the
lifecycles below, but introduce pattern details in [13].
• Lifecycle of a Key The lifecycle of a key starts when
a key pair is created for an entity. Once created, it can
be stored anywhere the entity prefers. If the private key
is lost or compromised, it might be recovered later or
replaced with a new private key. The key pair could
also be deleted if the entity does not need it anymore.
• Lifecycle of an Identifier Registering a DID on
blockchain using a created key is the beginning of a
DID’s lifecycle. Each DID is mapped to a blockchain
account’s public key to ensure uniqueness, and linked
to a DDO (DID Document) which specifies the public
keys, authentication protocols, and service endpoints.
Entities establish trust relationships by resolving each
involved entity’s DID, obtaining its respective DDO
and verifying the identity of the entity using the public
key kept in DDO. Once a DID is registered, its details
contained in the associated DDO can be updated. A
DID could also be revoked, if its owner does not need
the respective identity anymore.
• Lifecycle of a Credential The start of a credential’s
lifecycle is triggered by the request sent by a verifier.
The holder receives the request and sends credential
requirements to an issuer. The issuer generates the
required credential and signs on it. The holder receives
the credential and discloses it to the verifier. The verifier
can assure the credential authenticity by checking the
signature of the issuer. The credential could expire
after which it cannot be accessed by the verifier, or be
revoked by an issuer if it does not comply with the
respective regulations anymore.
3 DESIGN-PATTERN-AS-A-SERVICE FOR SSI
In this section, we present a Design-Pattern-as-a-Service
(DPaaS) platform architecture towards SSI. Fig. 2 illustrates
the overall three-layer architecture: 1) Service Layer, 2) Off-
Chain Data Layer, 3) On-Chain Data Layer. The Service
Layer is comprised of key services, DID services, and cre-
dential services. Services are classified into regular and
design pattern services. The code for each design pattern
discussed above is implemented, wrapped as an API and
delivered as services to facilitate the system development
and improve security and scalability.
3.1 Key Services
Key management related services are provided in wallet
applications. A user (i.e., an entity) is required to create at
least one blockchain account which contains a key pair for
sending/signing transactions and registering a DID.
To protect privacy and avoid key compromising, multi-
ple key pairs can be created by Master & Sub Key Generation
to split the management key (i.e., master-key) and signing
keys (i.e., sub-keys). A master-key is used for creating/-
managing all the identities owned by an entity, while sub-
keys are used to sign transactions for each identity account
representing different identity. Once a sub-key is compro-
mised, one can update the key/DID mapping with a new
sub-key using the master-key.
To recover a lost private key and avoid losing control
over the respective blockchain account, Shard Distribution
breaks the input private key into user-defined number of
pieces, while Shard Combination rebuilds the private key
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Fig. 2. Architecture of Design-Pattern-as-a-Service Platform for Self-Sovereign Identity.
if there are more input key pieces than the predefined
threshold.
Once a key pair is created, users can choose to store
the key in online wallet applications (i.e., hot wallets) or
manually write down on a piece of paper (i.e., cold wallet)
via Hot & Cold Wallet Storage. Compared to hot wallets, cold
wallets are more secure in that the disconnection from the
Internet protects them from adversarial online access, but
they are less convenient to use. A key pair can be removed
via Key Deletion when it is not needed anymore.
3.2 DID Services
Each DID in the platform is associated with one blockchain
account’s key pair to ensure its uniqueness. A user can
register a DID using one’s blockchain account via Registra-
tion or register multiple DIDs through Multiple Registration.
Multiple Registration allows each key pair to register a DID
for every identity an entity has to avoid privacy disclosure
caused by transactions correlation.
To ensure identity data integrity and address
blockchain’s scalability issue, a lightweight Identifier
Registry is created as a smart contract on blockchain, which
only maintains the mappings between registered DIDs and
their associated descriptions (i.e. DDOs). The identity data
and facts about a holder are stored in off-chain Identity
and Fact Data Repositories hosted by the respective issuers
(since we focus on legal identities). A registered DID can be
Bound with Social Media by creating 1-to-1 mapping record
in its DDO. This association improves the trustworthiness
of both social media profile and blockchain-based identity
involved.
One can obtain a DID’s respective public key and ser-
vice endpoints by acquiring the DDO via Resolution. Dual
Resolution allows two parties to establish a mutual trust
relationship with a single operation by extending Resolution.
A user inputs the DIDs of two involved parties and invokes
Dual Resolution through which the two parties obtain each
other’s DDO for resolution. To avoid manipulating DDO,
only the DID owner is allowed to update the respective
DDO using Update.
When the private key of a user’s blockchain account is
compromised, the update delegates preregistered in DID
Registry can vote to replace the DID’s compromised key with
a new safe key via Update by Delegates. A DID can be revoked
(e.g., an issuer organization is dissolved) by deleting the
associated DDO and marking the DID as revoked in the
DID registry smart contract via Revocation.
3.3 Credential Services
Credentials are maintained via credential services. To be-
come a valid issuer, an entity needs to first register via
Issuer Signup, which requires a super account’s (i.e., the
platform owner) approval. All the certified issuers’ DIDs are
maintained in Issuer Repository and can be updated by the
super account via Issuer Update. This design could be further
adapted in a decentralized way, by having a group of super
issuers register and maintain a new issuer.
To generate a new credential with higher level of se-
curity, a holder needs to first send the required credential
content requirements to the issuer’s service endpoint. The
issuer then invokes Selective Content Generation, fetching
relevant data from the local Identity and Fact Data Repository
and generating a signed credential in JSON format. The plat-
form generates a JSON Web Token (JWT) and sends it to the
issuer once the credential is stored in Credential Repository.
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Fig. 3. Performance evaluation.
Each JWT is used to identify and access a credential. Both
the credential and JWT are sent by the issuer to the holder’s
service endpoint.
Once the credential and JWT are received, the holder can
share them with the respective verifier. To avoid malicious
data disclosure, a holder can limit the accessible period of
a credential via Time-Constrained Access or One-Off Access. A
JWT is generated for the credential based on the accessible
period. Both of the credential and JWT are added as a new
record to Credential Repository. When a holder uses One-Off
Access, the access state flag is updated after the credential
is accessed. The holder sends the credential with chosen
access period and its respective JWT to the verifier who then
verifies it via Verification. The platform decodes JWT and
checks whether the access period has expired and access
flag is false. If the access period is valid, both authenticity
and integrity of the credential are checked for verification
using the input credential and signature.
An issuer can revoke an existing credential via Cancel-
lation if the holder no longer meets the prerequisites. All
revoked/expired credentials cannot be accessed. The in-
tegrity of data stored in Credential Repository, Identity and Fact
Data Repositories, and Issuer Repository is ensured through
Anchoring to Blockchain, which periodically stores the hash
value of the data in the respective off-chain repository in
Anchoring Registry smart contract.
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We developed a prototype using Node.jsv.10, and wrapped
the services into RESTful APIs via express.js. We selected
MySQL5.7.17 as the database and Parity1.9.2 with Proof-of-
Authority as blockchain. The block gas limit is 80M and
the block interval is 5s. Smart contracts are in Solidity with
compiler v.0.4.20.
To evaluate performance, we measure the throughput
of Registration and Time-Constrained Access. We deployed
the prototype on Alibaba Cloud (4 vCPUs, 16GB RAM,
40GB disk). The API requests are set to 20 calls/batch and
produced via JMeter for 1h. Fig. 3 illustrates that Registration
is about 70tps, while Time-Constrained Access stays around
200tps. The changes in performance over the duration may
be caused by the load generator. The fixed block inter-
val and limited block capacity cause an inclusion delay
each block which affects the throughput of Registration.
The performance of Selective Content Generation and One-Off
Access is similar to Time-Constrained Access. Also, we tested
Anchoring to Blockchain with 1000 credentials for 1000 times.
The response time is around 0.284s. Overall, the results
indicate that our platform achieves scalable performance for
organization-level adoption.
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